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ABSTRACT
File synchronization services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Microsoft OneDrive, Apple iCloud,
etc., are becoming increasingly popular in today’s always-connected world. A popular alternative
to the aforementioned services is BitTorrent Sync. This is a decentralized/cloudless file synchro-
nization service and is gaining significant popularity among Internet users with privacy concerns
over where their data is stored and who has the ability to access it. The focus of this paper is the
remote recovery of digital evidence pertaining to files identified as being accessed or stored on a
suspect’s computer or mobile device. A methodology for the identification, investigation, recovery
and verification of such remote digital evidence is outlined. Finally, a proof-of-concept remote evi-
dence recovery from BitTorrent Sync shared folder highlighting a number of potential scenarios for
the recovery and verification of such evidence.
Keywords: digital evidence, remote evidence recovery, BitTorrent sync, mobile device forensics
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud-based file synchronization services have
become very popular in recent years offering a
remote backup of data paired with the automa-
tion of data across multiple devices. As an indi-
cation of the growing popularity of these tools:
the largest of these providers, Dropbox, an-
nounced serving over 275 million users in April
2014, up from 200 million users in November
2013 Dropbox Inc. (2014). Highlighted by the
recent privacy concerns raised by the revela-
tion of the extent and reach of the National
Security Agency (NSA) in the United States
and their global Internet monitoring system,
PRISM, many corporate and home Internet
users have recently taken a keen interest in the
active protection of their privacy and of their
data. Duranti et al. (2013) conducted a cloud
security survey with corporate information stor-
age influencers (such as Records Managers, In-
formation Officers, Archivists, etc.). The au-
thors found found that 56% of the 323 respon-
dents were against cloud storage adoption due
to the potential security risk, and 40% of re-
spondents had concerns over the privacy risks.
BitTorrent Sync (BTSync) was launched as
an open alpha release in April 2013 to provide
users with a private, secure, decentralized file
synchronization tool capable of providing simi-
lar functionality to its cloud-based alternatives.
The most recent usage figures released by Bit-
Torrent Inc. are from December 2013 claiming
over two million active users – doubling from
the previous month. From a privacy stand-
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point, decentralized file synchronization solu-
tions are more desirable to their cloud-based
counterparts as the only method available for
any unauthorized user/body to access any pri-
vate data would require law enforcement to seek
a warrant to physically investigate the user’s
devices (in most jurisdictions). Whether col-
lecting evidence from a cloud-based or cloudless
solution, recovery and verification of remotely
gathered digital evidence poses a difficult task
to digital investigators in terms of technical best
practice and legal responsibilities.
The need for a solution to this remote dig-
ital evidence retrieval problem is compounded
further by the prevalence of smartphones and
tablets in today’s world. These devices typically
have much smaller local storage capacities when
compared with their desktop/laptop counter-
parts. As a result, the need for consumer tech-
nology users to have synchronized cloud/remote
data storage is ever increasing.
When configuring a newly purchased mobile
device based on Android, iOS or Windows oper-
ating systems, it is encouraged to enable cloud
synchronization options for the user’s mobile de-
vice information, such as contacts, emails, cal-
endar events, photos, documents, etc. Access-
ing data stored on cloud-based storage services
is a seamless process to the user for any mobile
device with a data connection.
When remotely stored information is accessed
on a mobile device, the data is downloaded to a
local temporary cache while the user is viewing
it and generally is deleted when the user closes
the mobile application or restarts the device.
This common feature of mobile applications
presents a difficult task for the digital forensic
investigator to identify, access and analyse this
potentially rich digital evidence source stored
remotely in the cloud and/or on synchronized
remote devices.
1.1 Contribution of This Work
While some work has been conducted on the
recovery of evidence from file synchronization
services, it mainly focuses on the gathering of
files and logs stored on the local machine’s
hard drive. Recovering evidence from cloud-
based solutions is generally conducted through a
browser interface or client application synchro-
nization, requiring the authentication details for
the service. At the time of writing, the au-
thors were unable to identify any publications
focused on an “after the fact” recovery of locally
compromised or unrecoverable evidence from a
decentralized file synchronization service. The
contribution of this work can be summarized as
follows:
• This paper presents a methodology for the
forensically sound remote recovery and ver-
ification of digital evidence from decen-
tralized file synchronization services. This
can enable forensic investigators to over-
come a number of counter-forensic tech-
niques potentially employed by cybercrim-
inals to cover their tracks.
• A proof-of-concept implementation of the
methodology is described for BTSync,
outlining the entry points to the inves-
tigation, the network specific knowledge
required for the remote recovery of digital
evidence and methods available to the
digital investigator for the verification of
any remotely collected evidence.
2. RELATED WORK
The following subsections outline work related
to that presented in this paper in the areas
of remote evidence acquisition, cloud-based
file synchronization forensics, mobile applica-
tion forensics and the court admissibility of
remotely gathered evidence. An introduction
to the BTSync application and its behavior is
also included.
2.1 Remote Evidence Recovery
A client server based system for remotely
gathering forensically sound disk images over
the Internet is outlined in an article by Scanlon
& Kechadi (2010). This system was based on
a live forensics scenario whereby the suspect
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machine is booted using a Linux based live CD
or USB key in order to take a verifiable, remote
clone of any storage device on the machine.
The evidence gathering and verification process
utilized frequent SHA512 hashing of “chunks”
of the remote hard drive in combination with
a hash of the remote volume in its entirety.
The authors found that the division of large
evidence examples, its transmission over an
encrypted Internet connection to a server in
a forensic laboratory and the subsequent re-
combination process did not interfere with the
resultant hash values when compared against
those of the original volume.
2.2 Cloud-Based File
Synchronization Forensics
The task of performing evidence acquisition
from cloud-based file synchronization systems
is the most analogous to the work presented as
part of this paper, despite using a centralized
server. Chung et al. (2012) proposed a novel
process model for the investigation of cloud stor-
age services outlining best practices for forensic
investigators. Research conducted into the ev-
idence recovery from cloud-based file synchro-
nization tools splits into two evidence gathering
tactics: local cloud evidence acquisition and re-
mote cloud evidence acquisition.
Local cloud evidence recovery focuses on re-
covering cloud storage remnants through hard
drive analysis. In a volume of work conducted
by Quick (2012), the local remnants of deleted
files is analyzed across Dropbox, Google Drive
and SkyDrive (now OneDrive). The metadata
that remained was sufficient to prove that a
cloud-based file was present on the local drive
after deletion. The authors also proved that
the act of downloading the data from the re-
mote location using a browser or synchronizing
using the client application does not change the
hash of the file or any associated cloud metadata
(Quick & Choo, 2013). The only metadata that
was different on the local machine when com-
pared to its cloud stored counterpart was the
file creation/modification dates.
Accessing remote digital evidence stored on
the servers of these cloud file synchronization
service providers is an arduous task for digi-
tal forensic investigators. In 2014, Federici de-
scribed a tool built for the collection of evidence
from the cloud called Cloud Data Imager (CDI)
built as an extension to the work conducted on
local cloud related remnants by Federici (2014).
CDI facilitates the read-only access to remote
evidence stored on Dropbox, Google Drive and
SkyDrive. This tool relies on the recovery of
the cloud service’s username and password or
an access token string from the local machine
for remote authentication.
2.3 Recovering Evidence from
Mobile Applications
There are three kinds of mobile device foren-
sic acquisition: logical, physical and mechanical
disassembly of the device. For the purposes of
this paper, first two types are of interest. Phys-
ical acquisition is used to directly clone all data
from the mobile device’s storage. It normally re-
quires on “jailbreaking” or “rooting” the mobile
device and using SSH communication to access
the device’s storage (Zdziarski, 2008). Logical
acquisition requires the availability of system
backups of the relevant device stored the sus-
pect’s computer. The drawback for this method
is that it cannot extract deleted data or access-
ing the system partition as these backups gener-
ally restricts evidence collection to the device’s
user data partition (Hoog & Strzempka, 2011).
With regards to iOS, unallocated space has been
largely inaccessible since iOS 4.0. This is due to
the encryption approach used by Apple to pre-
vent deleted files from being recovered. A new
encryption key is created for each file living on
the file system and when the file is deleted, that
key is removed resulting in an unrecoverable file.
Grispos et al. (2013) conducted a com-
prehensive analysis of Dropbox’s, Box’s and
SugarSync’s mobile cloud synchronization
applications for Android and iOS focusing on
the recoverability of cloud synchronized data.
The authors discovered that any files explicitly
marked for oﬄine access were recoverable from
both mobile operating systems (even if the file
was deleted from the cloud service). However,
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files that were merely viewed/accessed on the
mobile devices were generally not recoverable,
although some associated metadata remained.
2.4 Court Admissibility of Remotely
Gathered Evidence
As with any digital forensic evidence, the court
admissibility of the gathered information is
largely reliant on the experience of the expert
witness and comprehensive documentation of
the process. In many nations, the law lags be-
hind in formally recognizing the development of
new forensic processes. Kenneally (2005) pub-
lished a paper outlining the legal concerns in the
United States surrounding the live acquisition
of remote digital evidence. Kenneally surmises
that the admissibility of any digital evidence is
reliant on the integrity of the individual foren-
sic practitioner and that the acceptance of any
new evidence acquisition methodology requires
endorsement from law enforcement, forensic in-
vestigators and authoritative bodies. Baring
this status quo in mind, any evidence gathered
using the methodology outlined in the follow-
ing section should be reliable and reproducible
provided sufficient documentation of the process
used accompanies any evidence presented in a
courtroom. This view is echoed in many other
forensic publications, such as the view of Fed-
erici who states that a digital investigator is not
bound to a specific set of tool or approaches,
so long as he can justify his actions (Federici,
2014). In order to investigate a suspect’s mobile
device, generally a warrant is required. In a cor-
porate investigation, a warrant is not needed to
investigate any equipment owned by the com-
pany. However, it is illegal to seize or to in-
vestigate a personal mobile phone without the
consent of the owner of the device (Zdziarski,
2008).
2.5 BitTorrent Sync
BTSync shared folders rely on secrets to syn-
chronize data between peers. Secrets are the
unique identifiers used by BTSync to differen-
tiate between all shared folders across the net-
work. In order for the 33-byte secrets to be
human readable, they are displayed to the user
using Base32 encoding. BTSync facilitates the
generation of three categories of secrets for the
synchronizing of data contained within specific
folders - master secret (read/write), read-only
secret and an encrypted secret. Any client ap-
plication that is supplied this secret will syn-
chronize all files with any remote machines with
the same secret.
BTSync, as a decentralized solution differs to
the cloud based services outlined above (as can
be seen in Figure 1), while offering much of the
same synchronization functionality to the end
user. The key difference is that any data trans-
fer using BTSync can only occur if at least one
synchronized device is online. This makes the
recovery of the data quite different from a dig-
ital forensic perspective due to there being no
centralized file system, redundant data block al-
gorithms or requirement of cooperation from a
cloud storage provider to perform the investi-
gation. Due to the fact that BTSync uses a
distributed hash table (DHT) to disseminate
peer information, there is also no central au-
thority to manage authentication or log data ac-
cess/modification attempts. A suspect file iden-
tified on a system may have been downloaded
from one or many sources and may have been
subsequently uploaded to one or many recipi-
ents.
The pertinent metadata required for the re-
mote recovery of data are (Farina et al., 2014):
33-byte Secret – This is the unique identi-
fier of any given shared folder on the BTSync
network. It consists of a single byte indicating
the access level followed by a 32-byte applica-
tion generated salted hash of the folder.
<ShareID>.db – This file is a SQLite3
database. The database describes the con-
tents of the shared directory corresponding to
the ShareID. It contains two tables; files and
meta. The files table contains filenames, paths,
file sizes and SHA1 hash values for each individ-
ual file. The meta table contains information
pertaining to the file (filename, file size, SHA1
hash) and data relating to each of the pieces the
file is split up into for synchronization purposes
(number of pieces, size of each piece, piece SHA1
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Figure 1 Example Data Flow Highlighting the Difference Between Cloud-based (Left) and Decen-
tralized (Right) Synchronization
hash value and a SHA1 hash value of all con-
catenated piece hash values). Sample bencoded
data contained in the <ShareID>.db file is sim-
ilar to that outlined in Figure 2. Note bespoke
file information is included in angle brackets,
“#” represents the variable length of the associ-
ated value).
Figure 2 Bencoded File Information
In 2014, Scanlon et. al published a network
investigation methodology for BTSync Scanlon
et al. (2014). The paper performs an analysis
of the network traffic that is generated dur-
ing regular BTSync operation. The detailed
description of LAN multi-cast, tracker, relay
server, known host and file synchronization
communication are outlined. Several scenarios
for the potential malicious use of the network
are described including industrial espionage,
cloudless backup of illicit files, encrypted
remote P2P backup, dead drop, secure mes-
saging, piracy, server-less website hosting and
malicious software distribution. Any of these
scenarios could make the remote recovery of
digital evidence from the network relevant for
investigation.
3. REMOTE EVIDENCE
ACQUISITION
METHODOLOGY
The principle difference between evidence ac-
quisition from a centralized (generally cloud-
based) system and a decentralized (cloud-
less/serverless) system is the reliance on the
nodes themselves to maintain and update the
synchronized data. Example scenarios where
the acquisition of the remote synchronized evi-
dence may be necessary to the investigation in-
clude:
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Figure 3 Steps Involved in Remote Evidence Acquisition
• Deleted local data (unrecoverable) –
If the locally stored copy of the data has
been securely deleted or corrupted, then
the only available forensically sound source
to recover that data may be from the re-
motely synchronized machines.
• Identification of remote machines
after local uninstall – The complete
uninstallation of the application may be
employed as a counter-forensic technique
in order to obfuscate the participation in
any remote replication. Using recovered
remnants of the installation can lead to
the identification of remote IP addresses.
• Identification of remote machines
sharing the same file – Calculation of the
SHA1 hash of any incriminating evidence
could aid in the identification of remote IP
address sharing the same file.
• Data modified oﬄine – If synchronized
data has been modified on the local ma-
chine while oﬄine and the changes made
are pertinent to the investigation, remote
synchronization can aid in identifying what
changes were made.
• Evidence accessed on a mobile device
– In this scenario, the entry point to the
investigation may be evidence gathered of
a suspect viewing or accessing the data on a
mobile device. This data may only ever be
stored on the mobile device in a temporary
cache.
The remote acquisition of evidence identified
to have been accessed (or previously stored) on
the local machine involves a five step process,
as can be seen in Figure 3. Each of these
steps is outlined in greater detail the following
subsections.
3.1 Discovery – Identifying Entry
Points
Before an investigation can begin the investi-
gator must identify what possible entry points
exist for that particular protocol. These entry
points will identify resources that can be used
to create an accurate profile of the data being
replicated to or from the suspect device. In a
cloudless replication system there may not be a
single online accessible repository of the entire
dataset. The investigator must therefore not
only identify what data was potentially present
on the suspect system but also what data was
removed and whether it was replicated from or
to another system that is still accessible. For
this reason the investigator may be required
to retrieve data from a variety of sources such
as network traffic, RAM analysis, local system
analysis (hard drive forensics), mobile device
forensics performed on any network capable
device that the suspect user may have access
to. Often more than a single resource will be
required to build a complete enough picture to
enable accurate retrieval. The most common
entry points to an investigation are described
in more detail below.
3.1.1 Network Traffic Analysis
Network traffic analysis requires the investiga-
tor to examine the logs and raw data of the
communication between replicating peers in an
effort to determine what data was shared and in
which direction the data was replicated. Most
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often an investigator will initially just have log
files to work from that provide high level details
of the network traffic. The investigator should
therefore be familiar with the traffic signature
of the protocol being investigated. In the case of
an on-going investigation where a traffic source
is suspected, the investigator may have access to
network capture files which will provide a much
clearer and in depth image of the nature of the
communication. Again, the investigator should
be familiar with the traffic signatures in order
to correctly configure a capture or display filter
to make analysis faster and clearer. This will
also reduce the risk of inadvertently infringing
on the privacy of any non-suspect users.
3.1.2 File System Analysis
– A second entry point results from the analysis
of the suspect workstation. In this scenario,
the investigator has become aware that this
system is participating in a file synchronization
network. Once the investigator knows of
the presence of a file replication network in
use from a suspect system, the decision can
be made whether to perform a live forensic
investigation or whether to image the system
and perform postmortem analysis. Depending
on the type of system involved the investigator
will need to be familiar with the behavior of
the protocol to best determine the advantages
and disadvantages of each option.
3.1.3 Memory Analysis
– Memory analysis is another entry point
available to the investigator and can prove
vital if the replication protocol allows any
form of encryption or file security. In order to
process the files any application will usually
load potentially required security keys and
secrets into the process address space in RAM
for quick access and temporary storage. Once
the system is powered off or over a period of
activity any data stored in RAM will be lost
or overwritten (such as traces of connections
to remote ports or application communications
received). If the application is still installed
and running however, there will still be a base
level of information stored in RAM that may
provide evidence or at least may verify or help
explain items of interest found on other entry
points.
3.1.4 Mobile Device Analysis
– When a mobile device is mounted as a file
system, its raw partition looks like one large
file that contains both live and deleted data.
Data-carving tools such as Scalpel1, Ontrack
EasyRecovery2, etc., can scan the disk image
for deleted files. The investigation should focus
on the recovery of files relating to the applica-
tion, e.g., log files, metadata files, synchronized
files from the temporary cache, etc. These files
should provide an entry point into the shared
information or aid in the verification of entry
point information gathered from other sources.
3.2 Investigation – Uncovering Local
Metadata
Once the entry points have been identified the
investigator must assess the priority of their
analysis. In general, this priority will follow the
same order as that laid out in the Association of
Chief Police Officers (2011) (ACPO) guidelines
taking volatility into account. The investigator
must also identify where one source of data can
be used to verify the conclusions drawn from an-
other data source. For example, network traf-
fic captured from live traffic or gathered from
network logs may be cross referenced with net-
work data extracted from a RAM dump taken
from the suspect system. After the available
entry points have been discovered, the investi-
gator must determine the reliability of the ev-
idence source with respect to age and poten-
tial tampering. A set of relevant data evidence
must then be generated and profiled in order
to create a subset that contains data that has
been changed, deleted or otherwise tampered
with. In general this process will take the form
of identifying data that:
1https://github.com/sleuthkit/scalpel
2http://www.krollontrack.com/data-
recovery/recovery-software/
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Table 1 Files Included in Source Share
Filename Filesize SHA1
badfileone.txt 19B 58B47FB1467AEB0BEFE6FE1BD6255A5C24B552A0
badfiletwo.txt 124B B47C7586BC82B27A8441A8E4C07F77874CC67557
badfilethree.txt 152B 3598492B4D1CE5FAFD9EF76E8FA54C8F55E0716A
• Reveals what evidence exists such as a
share or file manifest, a directory listing or
some log of data shared
• Reveals what evidence has been altered
or destroyed and when this occurred.
Most replication systems use timestamps
to record alteration times so the required
replication direction can be determined to
ensure later changes are not overwritten by
older.
• Describes if and where a viable copy of the
evidence can be retrieved. The investiga-
tor must be aware of any versioning facility
available within the protocol and how the
protocol handles local changes to replicated
data.
• Allows access to the remote copy of the
evidence. This could be in the form of
certificates, passwords or phrases or even
just some combination of system files
that are checked by the application to
determine system level access rather than
user or account level permissions.
3.3 Enumeration –
Identifying Remote Data Stores
Based on the entry point information collected,
a peer discovery survey must be carried out
to determine the totality of the participants in
the network or share. Each potential remote
synchronization node must be identified and
queried to determine if recovery is possible
from that source. Ideally, a source of remote
evidence that has directly synchronized with
the suspect’s device would be identified for
maintaining provenance.
3.4 Recovery –
Downloading of Remote
Evidence
With the remote peers identified and prioritized
the investigator should now determine what
required version of the data is present and
available. Any retrieval performed by the
investigator should be carried out through pro-
grammatically ethical means without unduly
alerting the remote host and in a forensically
sound manner. This step is best performed
either through the software used for replication
originally or through a bespoke version of client
software that uses the underlying protocol to
retrieve the data in the same manner as it was
initially gathered.
3.5 Verification –
Ensuring Forensic Integrity
Due to the sensitive nature of digital evidence
collection, it is imperative that the data
collected by any forensic tool is completely
verifiable and identical to the original source.
In order for any remotely gathered evidence
captured using this methodology to be court
admissible, it must be proven to be true to the
original data that was stored/accessed on the
suspect device. Each of the aforementioned
synchronization services rely on frequent hash-
ing of each file to ensure data integrity and to
detect any local changes to be updated to other
synced devices. Gaining access to these hashes
or remnants thereof can quickly facilitate the
verification of any remotely gathered evidence.
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4. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT
EXAMPLE
To confirm our methodology, we conducted a
proof-of-concept investigation on the remote
recovery and verification of evidence from a
BTSync share. We selected BTSync due to its
mostly decentralized nature. BTSync is based
upon BitTorrent, a popular file transfer proto-
col, which has made significant strides towards
complete decentralization in recent years. The
BTSync application allows the user to configure
most aspects of the file synchronization process
and the peer discovery process.
4.1 Setup
1. A source machine ComputerA was set up
with a BTSync shared folder containing the
files outlined in Table 1.
2. The file badfileone.txt was then deleted
before any remote synchronization was al-
lowed to take place.
3. A second machine ComputerB had the BT-
Sync read-only secret added to the appli-
cation and synchronization was allowed to
complete.
4. The file badfilethree.txt was subse-
quently securely deleted from ComputerB
to simulate the anti-forensic destruction of
evidence.
4.2 Entry Points
The entry points possible for a BTSync investi-
gation are:
1. Extracting metadata from a local memory
snapshot taken while the application is run-
ning.
2. Analyzing BTSync network traffic.
3. Local file system forensics.
4. The BTSync mobile application and asso-
ciated files.
The analysis of entry points 1-3 is outlined
in the two BTSync publications previously
discussed Farina et al. (2014); Scanlon et al.
(2014). For the purpose of the experiment
outlined in this section, a logical forensic ac-
quisition of an iPhone 4S with a synchronized
BTSync application was conducted with Oxy-
gen Forensic Suite 2014 (as the iOS version used
was iOS 7.1.1). The pertinent BTSync files in
the application’s folder structure are all stored
in a BitTorrent Sync subfolder. This folder
contains files such as settings.dat, sync.log,
sync.pid, sync.dat, etc. The synchronized
data files are stored in the Storage subfolder
where the .SyncID, .SyncIgnore can also be
found. Assuming the investigator’s objective is
to recover deleted files on this device, common
forensic mobile device data recovery tools, such
as Ontrack EasyRecovery and Oxygen Forensic
Suite, are not fit for purpose. As a result, the
only other avenue available to recover this data
is to perform evidence recovery from remotely
synchronized machines.
4.3 Investigation
With the entry points identified, the required
secrets, ShareID, log files and file hashes can be
gathered. In order to verify the gathered in-
formation required for the investigation, a sec-
ondary source should be used to corroborate the
data. Figure 4 outlines the list of BTSync share
specific information available from each of the
entry points. If two or more of these sources cor-
respond, the higher the reliability of the gath-
ered information. If conflicting information is
gathered from two or more sources, it is likely
that this inconsistency may result from a out of
date synchronization or local file I/O handling.
In order for the investigation to be possible, the
minimum required metadata from any source is
the secret.
The BTSync protocol transfers a full copy of
the file manifest (contained in <ShareID>.db)
in its current local state from the source sys-
tem before any replication is initiated. Any de-
vice that is associated with a share will store a
full manifest listing the file metadata and cor-
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Figure 4 Metadata Available from Each Entry Point
Table 2 Location of BTSync Specific Metadata (R = Recoverable, P = Possibly Recoverable)
Evidence Item Network RAM sync.dat .SyncID ¡ShareID¿.db sync.log
ShareID R R R R R
Secret R R
PeerID R P R
File List P R R
File Hash P R
Remote Peers R P R R
Ports R R R
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responding state on the source machine. This
manifest can also contain metadata from each
peer contributing to any modifications on the
shared folder. A mobile phone that has the
application installed and a secret applied may
store a full file manifest, which gets updated
whenever the application is run. This update
will occur from any active remote machine, even
if no file is ever accessed on the mobile device.
The most reliable source of evidence is that
gathered from the share, log and application
files stored on a computer’s hard drive, e.g.,
data forensically discovered on ComputerB in
the example investigation. However, the mem-
ory image can contain data that does not have
the opportunity to be recorded to the hard
drive, such as open ports. It may contain data
that supersedes that on the physical drive such
as the contents of the <ShareID>.db-wal (write
ahead log) file. This file acts as a cache of
data waiting to be written to the <ShareID>.db
SQLite3 database. In testing, the metadata in-
formation outlined in Table 2 are recoverable
from the marked sources.
The investigator should try to ascertain which
secret extracted from RAM is associated with
which shared folder. ShareIDs are derived from
the secret.
In any shared folder, an investigator can
find the .SyncID file. This file contains the
ShareID that corresponds to that shared folder.
The investigator must use a hex viewer to
extract the ShareID from the .SyncID file. To
determine the location of the shared folder as-
sociated with any given secret, the investigator
can search in the sync.dat file located the
directory locations outlined below:
∼\AppData\Roaming\BitTorrent Sync (Windows)
∼/Library/Application Support/BitTorrent Sync/
(Mac OS X)
[folder where BTSync is extracted]/.sync/
(Linux)
[Applications]/com.bittorent.BitTorrentSync/
Documents/BitTorrent Sync/ (iOS)
The sync.dat file is a bencoded dictionary
consisting of a series of blocks describing each
share active on the system and the preferences
set for that particular share. The entry for each
share contains the information outlined in Ta-
ble 3.
From this file, the shared folder location can
be recovered and subsequently the .SyncID file.
Once the ShareID is known, the investigator can
examine the corresponding <ShareID>.db file
(described above) and can look for file entries
that have the following Key:Value pairs:
state:i2e – The file was deleted on
the source system and was either
never synchronized or was moved to
the .SyncArchive folder (if set in
settings.dat) and stored for 30 days
before deletion from the system.
invalidated:i1e – The file was locally
deleted or modified and no longer receives
updates from the source system as a result.
The mtime value will store the timestamp
of when the file was invalidated. For a
modified file, the hash20 value stored in
the <ShareID>.db file is the hash value of
the last known valid version of the file, i.e.,
matching hash values with the source file.
4.4 Enumeration
Next we enumerate the members of the repli-
cating peer group. A bespoke peer discovery
application was created to identify active
peers for any given ShareID using each of
the regular peer discovery methods, e.g, LAN
multicast, tracker and DHT. Each of the
discovered IP:Port pairs was added to a list
for later querying and file synchronization.
It is important to note that each peer must
“check-in” to the tracker and DHT every X
minutes in order to be returned as active from
those services (X is typically in the 10-60
minute range depending on configuration – the
default value for this on our example machines
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Table 3 List of Key:Value Pairs for Each Share Contained in sync.dat
Key Value
path Path to the share folder
secret 33 character secret associated with that share
pub key 256-bit public key here. Only shares that have
performed a handshake online will have a public
key assigned.
stopped by user Binary toggle (0/1) if the synchronization of the
share was canceled by the user
use dht Binary toggle to use DHT for peer discovery
use lan broadcast Binary toggle to use LAN broadcast messages
use relay Binary toggle to use a relay server if a remote peer
cannot be contacted directly
use tracker Binary toggle to use a tracker server
(t.usyncapp.com) for peer discovery
use known hosts Binary toggle to use a list of host IP for direct
contact
peers Start of the list of recorded peers that have inter-
acted with the share
id Remote PeerID
last sync completed Epoch timestamp of the last time the peer was
synchronized to or from
is 30 minutes). As a result, the list of active
peers identified will frequently change due
to network churn. It is possible to identify
peers that were previously contacted from the
local sync.log file on the suspect machine
(ComputerB in the sample investigation). This
file will contain the resolved remote hostnames,
the corresponding remote PeerIDs, timestamps
and specific file upload/download activity from
any synchronization activity.
4.5 Recovery
BTSync was installed on a monitored virtual
machine for remote recovery purposes. The se-
cret was added to the application and the file
synchronization process was allowed to com-
plete. Only IP addresses gathered during the
previous step were permitted for connection, fa-
cilitated through the use of the “Known Peers”
option in the BTSync application. Remote re-
covery is possible if the entire file is available
from one or more remote sources. Each re-
mote machine will store pieces of each file in
the shared folder (though unlikely, it is possible
that no single remote machine has the entire
file). The number of pieces for each file is deter-
mined by the total size divided by the defined
piece length (the default piece length is 32kb).
In order for a file to be recoverable, each in-
dividual piece must be offered by at least one
remote machine. If only a subset of pieces are
available, partial evidence recovery is still pos-
sible (resulting in a similar recovery from a file
stored on a corrupted block on a hard disk).
This recovery step can also be used to collect
data that has been locally deleted from a
mobile device. The BTSync mobile application
facilitates the automatic upload of all photos
and videos taken using the device’s camera
and this data will remain on remote machines
irrespective of whether the media is deleted
from the phone or not.
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4.6 Verification
The underlying BitTorrent protocol used by
BTSync for file transfer relies on regular hash
checking. The indexing of all shared BTSync
files uses systematic SHA1 hashing to know
when a file is updated on a remote system. The
value for the hash key stored for each individual
file in the ShareID.db database is calculated us-
ing Formula 1.
hashkey = SHA1(SHA1(Piece1)||
SHA1(Piece2)||...||SHA1(PieceN)) (1)
Comparing this gathered file specific hash
to that of the corresponding downloaded files
can ensure a true copy of the original is down-
loaded. If only a partial download is possible,
the 32kb piece hashes can be used to verify
each piece of against the corresponding piece
of the original file. Any downloaded piece with
an incorrect hash (likely as a result of a cor-
rupted download) can simply be discarded and
re-downloaded from the same remote source or
any available alternative source.
With regards to the sample investigation,
we identified that badfilethree.txt had
been synchronized and subsequently deleted
from ComputerB. This was discovered in
the sync.log file and confirmed by cross-
referencing against <ShareID>.db (the value of
the invalidated tag was set to “1” indicating
that a local unsynchronized modification had
taken place).
In order to recover the file, using a foren-
sically sound evidence recovery machine, all
peer discovery methods were disabled besides
the “Known Peers” option, where ComputerA’s
IP address was added. badfilethree.txt
was subsequently downloaded from ComputerA.
The SHA1 hash of this file was found to be
3598492B4D1CE5FAFD9EF76E8FA54C8F55E0716A
which corresponds to that of the original file,
as outlined in Table 1 above.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper outlined a methodology for the
secure, verifiable, remote recovery of digital
evidence from a decentralized file synchroniza-
tion network. The verification of the gathered
evidence is aided by the native hash-based
verification of the protocol itself. Decentralized
networks must use frequent hashing to verify
the integrity of the synchronized information.
Accessing this information can be an invaluable
source of digital fingerprinting for the forensic
investigator. Any discovered hashes can be used
to verify the evidence gathered from remote
machines to be true copies of the original. The
reliance on frequent hashing of these networks
can also be beneficial for the investigator when
comparing these values against a list of known
incriminating hash values.
5.1 Weaknesses of Current
Approach
One weakness of the current approach is that
the remote machine can detect an unknown
IP connecting to it and requesting to sync
the evidence. It is possible that the re-
mote machine might disconnect/shutdown upon
detecting an unknown/suspicious IP address
range. Firewall/blacklist rules, e.g., the shared
hostiles.txt on the Gnutella network, are
freely available on the web detailing the IP ad-
dresses of known law enforcement, P2P moni-
toring agencies and research bodies.
A second weakness of this approach occurs
should the remote data be deleted/altered in
the time frame between the physical gathering
of a suspect’s devices and the subsequent
remote evidence acquisition. In this scenario,
the hash of the remote files will not match any
locally stored hashes or indeed the files may
not be recoverable at all if no remote host of
the evidence can be identified.
5.2 Future Work
BitTorrent Inc. have announced that future ver-
sions of BitTorrent Sync will facilitate selective
syncing, i.e., joining the share of a particular se-
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cret, but allowing the user to decide what files
to download. The company have also hinted
at releasing a corporate, private version of the
tool eliminating the requirement for any Inter-
net/external access.
The aforementioned investigative tool can be
expanded upon to investigate further networks,
including those designed to afford anonymity
to its users. This would include the investi-
gation and remote recovery of evidence from
further decentralized networks including own-
Cloud3, Syncthing4 and OnionShare5.
When a sufficient number of networks have
been analyzed, a universal decentralized file
synchronization forensic tool should be devel-
oped to aid in future investigations.
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